Much more adequate details about IAHs, for instance the return on IAHs funds, the process of calculation and distribution in the profits, might lower data asymmetry. This leads IAHs to monitor the manager’s opportunistic behavior and, consequently, to shield their rights. The outcomes reported in Table 5 show also that the adoption of AAOIFI standards is optimistic and extremely important at a level of 1 with the level of IAH disclosure. Consequently, hypothesis H3 is accepted. This obtaining supports the stakeholder theory whereby AAOIFI accounting requirements identify the wants of IAHs as big stakeholders in Islamic banks. These requirements address the unique characteristics of products and services of Islamic banks and improve the credibility of their economic statements (Sarea and Hanefah 2013). This obtaining is consistent with Al-Baluchi (2006), who located that the level of voluntary DNQX disodium salt Biological Activity disclosure within the annual reports of Islamic banks enhanced after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. Furthermore, our getting is in line with that of El-Halaby (2015) who revealed that the adoption of AAOIFI standards includes a considerable positive association with monetary disclosure, which reflects the significance of the adoption of those standards in all Islamic banks. The degree of liquidity includes a good and important relationship at the 5 level with the degree of IAH disclosure in the sampled Islamic banks. Hence, hypothesis H4 is accepted. This implies that greater levels of liquidity in an Islamic bank lead to Charybdotoxin manufacturer larger levels of IAH disclosures in their annual reports. This result supports the signaling theory, where greater liquidity can lead Islamic banks to enhance their performance and, hence, to disclose optimistic signals on their safe financial positions. This result is inconsistent with these of Bin Harun (2016) and Elgattani and Hussainey (2020), who located no considerable relationship between liquidity and corporate disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks. Bank profitability has a negative and insignificant effect on IAH disclosure levels. Therefore, hypothesis H5 is rejected. This means that banks with greater profitability disclose less adequate IAH details. This result is inconsistent with the signaling theory, suggesting that managers tend to disclose far more detailed information as optimistic signal to investors. Consequently, they could improve investors’ confidence and attract other possible investors. This result is in contrast with those of Arshad et al. (2012) and Bukair and Raman (2013), who discovered a considerable positive relationship involving bank functionality and CSR disclosure in Islamic banks. Table five also shows that bank size and ownership have optimistic and hugely substantial relationships together with the degree of IAH disclosure in the level of 1 . Nonetheless, both bank age and GDP growth have no effect on the IAHs disclosure level in Islamic banks. 4.five. Robustness Evaluation Following Gujarati (2004), we applied GLS estimation inside the earlier section to overcome heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation complications. Nevertheless, this estimation has been criticized by Beck and Katz (1995). The latter has shown that GLS estimation produces extremely overconfident coefficient common errors. They proposed the usage of the Panel Corrected Typical Errors (PCSE) approach as a more proper process for offering correct coefficient standard errors. Thus, we proceed within this section to verify the robustness of our GLSJ. Danger Monetary Manag. 2021, 14,11 ofresults.